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CYBERSECURITY, DATA BREACHES, AND THE ECONOMIC 
LOSS DOCTRINE IN THE PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY 
DAVID W. OPDERBECK∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Data breaches are pervasive and costly.  Recent civil data 
breach cases have centered on the consumer credit card payment 
chain in the retail industry.  An important issue in such cases is 
whether the economic loss doctrine should bar negligence claims 
for purely pecuniary losses suffered by a non-negligent party, 
such as an issuing bank or a federal credit union that must incur 
costs to reimburse cardholders for the fraudulent use of stolen 
card numbers.   
 The economic loss doctrine should not bar these claims.  Large-
scale data networks, such as consumer credit card networks, 
often entail significant network externalities.  These include 
externalities relating to market concentration as well as to the 
“weakest link” nature of security in these networks.  Although the 
primary players in these networks are tied together in a complex 
web of contractual relationships, there are significant transaction 
costs involved with any effort to change or monitor another 
party’s security measures.  Moreover, “outside” entities such as 
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third-party payment processors, which are not in contractual 
privity with all other parties in the network, have become 
ubiquitous.  Under these circumstances, a negligence rule should 
help improve cybersecurity hygiene and promote a more robust 
cyber risk insurance market. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is not a question of if you will suffer a data breach; it is a question of 
when.  That is the warning cybersecurity experts regularly provide to 
enterprises of every sort in every segment of the economy.1  This warning is 
more than an effort by high-priced consultants to spread FUD2 in the hope 
that their clients will purchase expensive cybersecurity services.  It is a 
reality of the digital age.  Your cybersecurity may be good, but the hackers 
are better.  Your data security policies may be comprehensive, but it takes 
only one tired, lazy, stupid, or malicious employee to release your native 
data irretrievably into the wild.3 
Most analysts agree that the cost of data breaches are significant.  The 
most recent Verizon Data Breach Report suggests that the average cost to 
breached entities is 58¢ per record, while the most recent Ponemon Institute 
report suggests an average cost of over $200 per record.4  A breach 
involving a major retailer may encompass tens of millions of individual 
records.5  A recent study suggests that data breaches will cost the U.S. 
economy $2 trillion by 2019.6 
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., Kate Vinton, How Companies Can Rebuild Trust After a Security Breach, 
FORBES (July 1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2014/07/01/how-companies-can-
rebuild-trust-after-a-security-breach/. 
 2.  FUD is an acronym for “fear, uncertainty, and doubt,” originally coined as a term for an 
IBM comparative sales technique.  Fud, Fud in Technology, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fud (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 3.  See, e.g., Defending the Digital Frontier, ECONOMIST (July 12, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21606416-companies-markets-and-countries-are-
increasingly-under-attack-cyber-criminals. 
 4.  VERIZON ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS, 2015 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 28 
(2015), http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/; PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2015 COST OF  
DATA BREACH STUDY: UNITED STATES 1 (2015), http://www-03.ibm.com/security/data-breach/.  
A “record” is a piece of information, such as a payment card number, personally identifying 
information or medical record.  See VERIZON ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS, supra, at 28. 
 5.  See, e.g, Brian Krebs, In Home Depot Breach, Investigation Focuses on Self-Checkout 
Lanes, KREBS ON SECURITY (Sept. 18, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/target-data-breach/ 
(noting that Target data breach exposed over 40 million records, and that the Home Depot breach 
was probably larger). 
 6.  JUNIPER RESEARCH, CYBERCRIME AND THE INTERNET OF THREATS 5 (2015), 
https://www.juniperresearch.com/document-library/white-papers/cybercrime-the-internet-of-
threats. 
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The size and scale of these estimates suggests that the data breach 
problem is not only poorly contained—it is out of control.  The enormous 
disparity between the cost to the breached entity (which already is sizable) 
and the overall economic costs (which could represent a meaningful 
percentage of GDP) suggests that the problem entails significant 
externalities.  An externalities problem of this scope ordinarily indicates a 
need for some kind of governmental regulation.7  Where the problem entails 
a need to exercise care against harms that impose externalities, tort law 
naturally presents itself as an option in the regulatory mix.8  But even as the 
U.S. Congress has failed to pass significant cybersecurity legislation, the 
tort system has proven largely incapable of exercising much discipline over 
cybersecurity standards.9 
Claims in civil data breach cases have fallen into two broad categories: 
(1) claims by consumers of the breached entity—usually a retailer, bank, or 
consumer service provider—whose credit card information, social security 
numbers, or other personally identifying information has been disclosed; 
and (2) claims by entities in the financial services chain who have incurred 
reimbursement, remediation, and other costs as a result of a data breach 
suffered by another party in the chain—again, usually a retailer, bank or 
consumer service provider.10 
Most of these cases have failed at the pleading stage.11  On the 
consumer side, the problem is that any direct losses usually are reimbursed 
by the credit card issuer and any potential future losses are speculative.12  
Tort claims in most consumer cases are resolved, or can be resolved, 
through Article III standing requirements.13  On the business side, however, 
plaintiffs often are able to prove unreimbursed economic damages caused 
by the data breach.14  The issue in these cases is that the direct losses are 
                                                          
 7.  See HOWELL E. JACKSON, ET. AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS (2004), 
reprinted in STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19–21 (Foundation Press, 2004) 
(explaining the benefits of resolving externality problems through tort liability). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 
795, 801–11 (2012) [hereinafter Opderbeck, Cybersecurity] (summarizing proposed cybersecurity 
legislation); David W. Opderbeck, Current Developments in Data Breach Litigation: Article III 
Standing After Clapper, 67 S. CAR. L. REV. ___ (2016) (forthcoming) (discussing issues with tort 
and other actions arising from data breaches); Jennifer Steinhauer, House Passes Cybersecurity 
Bill After Companies Fall Victim to Data Breaches, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1JsSzGl (noting failed efforts to pass cybersecurity reform). 
 10.  See David W. Opderbeck, Civil Litigation and Data Breaches in the Consumer Financial 
Services Industry, in PLI, THINK LIKE A LAWYER, TALK LIKE A GEEK 2014 (Nov. 2014). 
 11.  See id. 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  See id. 
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solely economic, and it is often unclear whether, or to what extent, there 
might be a contractual remedy for those losses.15  In business-to-business 
data breach cases, in other words, the deeper question is whether tort claims 
are barred by the “economic loss doctrine.”16 
The economic loss doctrine, or, more accurately, the complex of 
principles that relate to tort claims for purely economic harms, is hotly 
contested ground in contemporary tort policy.  The American Law Institute 
released a draft proposal in Restatement (Third) of Torts for Liability for 
Economic Harm in 2012 that has attracted significant debate.  As Professor 
Vincent Johnson has noted, the economic loss doctrine represents a 
“boundary” question between tort policy and private ordering.17  Those who 
believe systemic economic risks are best allocated through contracts, 
insurance, social norms, and other forms of private ordering will tend to 
view the economic loss doctrine as an important bulwark against judicial 
regulation.  Those who believe systemic economic risks entail externalities, 
agency problems, and other distortions that inevitably compromise the 
efficiency of private ordering will tend to view the economic loss doctrine 
as an impediment to the salutary risk-spreading and deterrence effects of the 
tort system. 
This disagreement is particularly acute in the data breach context 
because the economic risks are so pervasive and wide-ranging.  Today’s 
global economy cannot function without the Internet, the “cloud,” email, 
networked computer automation, and other components of “cyberspace,” 
including the global consumer credit card payment networks.  When 
everything is connected, a breach at one node of the network potentially 
affects all nodes, or a multiplicity of nodes, in unpredictable, non-linear 
ways.  Can tort law play any principled role in managing this risk?  Or is it 
more likely that tort claims will provide windfalls to lawyers and some 
individual plaintiffs without improving the system over private ordering—
or worse, while making the system more rigid and vulnerable? 
Part II of this Article reviews recent trends in civil litigation over data 
breaches, with particular attention to how the economic loss doctrine is 
applied to tort claims in such cases.  As Part II discusses, most large-scale 
civil data breach litigation has arisen in the context of theft of consumer 
credit card data from large retailers.  This means that the common law in 
this area has developed in relation to a unique economic infrastructure 
resource, the global consumer credit card network, which will be examined 
                                                          
 15.  See id. 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 523, 546–49 (2009).  By a “boundary” question Professor Johnson means 
something that marks the difference between one area of law and another area.  See id. 
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in some detail.  Part III examines the policy behind the economic loss 
doctrine and its application to data breach cases, particularly in credit card 
data theft cases where substantial network externalities are present.  The 
discussion in Part III considers two factors that so far remain unexamined in 
the case law and scholarly literature: the role of third-party payment 
processors in the consumer credit card chain, and the availability of cyber 
risk insurance.  Part IV evaluates whether the tort system can help correct 
market failures relating to data breaches even when the losses are purely 
economic.  Part IV reviews the arguments of other scholars who suggest 
that the tort system should play little or no role in promoting cybersecurity, 
and suggests that in circumstances where significant network externalities 
are present tort remedies may help improve cybersecurity.  Part V 
concludes. 
II.  TORT CLAIMS FOR DATA BREACHES 
A.  Consumer Credit Card Networks 
The question of civil remedies for data breaches has been complicated 
by the fact that most civil litigation to date has arisen as the result of credit 
card information theft.  A basic model of the web of relationships in 
consumer credit networks includes the credit card brand, the issuer bank, 
the consumer, the acquirer bank, and the merchant.18  The relationships 
between and among each of these parties are governed by contracts with 
corresponding economic interests: 
 
                                                          
 18.  See Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Nat’l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 594 (11th Cir. 1986).   
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An individual card customer acquires a branded card (such as a Visa 
card) from an issuer bank.19  Merchants are set up to receive credit card 
payments for goods and services by acquirer banks.20  The issuer and 
acquirer banks each have contractual relationships with the card network.21  
The card network supplies to the banks the right to use the brand and access 
to the networks payment processing services.22  The banks each pay 
membership dues and per-transaction fees to the networks.23  When a 
cardholder makes a purchase using his or her card, the merchant transmits 
the purchase information to the acquirer bank, which, through the card 
brand network, inquires about the cardholder’s credit status at the issuer 
bank.24  If the cardholder possesses adequate credit, the approval of the 
transaction is communicated from the issuer bank to the acquirer bank 
through the card network.25  The acquirer bank reimburses the merchant for 
the purchase price of the goods or services supplied to the customer, like a 
“discount fee,” which is a percentage of the transaction price.26  The issuer 
bank reimburses the acquirer bank for the purchase price, less an 
“interchange” fee.27  The customer is responsible to repay the purchase 
amount to the issuer bank, usually with interest, if the amount is not paid in 
full within the first billing cycle.28 
The largest networks worldwide are Visa and Mastercard.29  The Visa 
and Mastercard networks are “four-party” networks, which involve an 
issuer bank, the cardholder, an acquirer bank, and the merchant.30  Other 
substantial networks include American Express, Discover Card, and Diners 
                                                          
 19.  For sources relating to this general description, see, e.g., NaBanco, 779 F.2d at 594; 
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 152–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. 
Visa U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 331–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Mark MacCarthy, Information 
Security Policy in the U.S. Retail Payments Industry, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3–4; How a 
Visa Transaction Works, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/content_library/modal/how-visa-transaction-
works.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016); Payments 101: Credit and Debit Card Payments, FIRST 
DATA 6–9 (Oct. 2010), http://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thought-
leadership/payments101wp.pdf. 
 20.  See generally supra note 19. 
 21.  See generally supra note 19. 
 22.  See generally supra note 19. 
 23.  See generally supra note 19. 
 24.  See generally supra note 19. 
 25.  See generally supra note 19. 
 26.  See generally supra note 19. 
 27.  See generally supra note 19. 
 28.  See generally supra note 19. 
 29.  U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: 
MERCHANT PROCESSING 2 (2014), http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-merchant-processing.pdf. 
 30.  Id.; Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, 533 F.3d 162, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Club.31  These are three-party networks in which the issuer bank is the same 
as the acquirer bank.32 
Both three- and four-party networks require the issuer and acquirer 
banks to agree to detailed sets of policies that govern the parties’ 
relationships.33  These policies typically include data security provisions.  
The VISA Core Rules, for example, state that all Visa network members 
must “[m]aintain all materials or records in any form that contains account 
or Transaction Information in a safe and secure manner with access limited 
to authorized personnel, as specified in the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (“PCI DSS”)” and further must “[e]nsure that all agents 
and Merchants with access to account or Transaction Information comply 
with the . . . PCI DSS.”34  The VISA Core Rules also require members to 
ensure that agents and merchants do not store certain information, including 
the “[f]ull contents of any data taken from the Magnetic Stripe,” subsequent 
to a transaction authorization.35 
The Fair Credit Billing Act (“FCBA”) limits the cardholder’s liability 
for unauthorized use of his or her credit card to $50 and provides for zero 
liability if the card number was stolen without the physical card.36  The 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”) limits the card holder’s liability for 
unauthorized use of his or her card to $50 if the loss is reported within two 
business days after it is discovered or to $500 if the loss is reported between 
two business days and sixty calendar days after it is discovered.37 
In practice, the major card networks have adopted “zero liability” 
policies in cases of data theft.38  Under the VISA Core Rules, for example, 
an issuer is required to credit the cardholder’s account for any electronic 
commerce transaction that involves fraud where the card was physically 
                                                          
 31.  COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 2.   
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See, e.g., VISA CORE RULES AND VISA PRODUCT AND SERVICE RULES § 1.1.1.1 (2015), 
https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/about-visa/15-April-2015-Visa-Rules-Public.pdf (“All 
participants in the Visa system are subject to and bound by the Visa Charter Documents and the 
Visa Rules, as applicable based on the nature of their participation and geography.”).  The Visa 
Core Rules and Visa Service Rules are more than 800 pages long.  See id.  The Visa Interlink 
Network, Inc. Operating Regulations for participation in the Visa Interlink Network, which relates 
to electronic funds transfer (“debit”) cards, is 180 pages long.  See VISA, INTERLINK NETWORK, 
INC. OPERATING REGULATIONS (2014), https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/about-
visa/interlink-operating-regulations.pdf. 
 34.  VISA CORE RULES, supra note 33, § 1.10.4.1. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b) (2015); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
LOST OR STOLEN CREDIT, ATM AND DEBIT CARDS 2–3 (2012), 
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0075-lost-or-stolen-credit-atm-and-debit-cards.pdf.   
 37.  15 U.S.C. § 1693(g); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 3. 
 38.  See, e.g., VISA, Security + Support, Resolve Issues, 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/zero-liability.jsp (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
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absent.39  Further, in the U.S., “an [i]ssuer must limit the [c]ardholder’s 
liability to zero upon receipt of notification from its [c]ardholder of an 
unauthorized Visa Consumer Card or Visa Business Card Transaction.”40  
The VISA Core Rules further purport to “assign liability” between the 
issuer and acquirer for certain counterfeit transactions and provide an 
arbitration and compliance mechanism for disputes between members.41 
The “presentation” and “card not present” rules represent some of the 
most important components of this mechanism.  In a brick-and-mortar 
transaction, the customer must present the physical credit or debit card at 
the point of sale, and the merchant must take certain steps to authenticate 
the card.42  It is, of course, possible for data thieves to manufacture 
counterfeit cards, purchase goods in brick-and-mortar retailers, and fence 
the goods online or elsewhere. The presentation rules for in-person 
purchases, however, at least create some additional transaction costs and 
provide some checks that might reduce the overall incidence of fraud.  If the 
retailer complies with the card presentation rules, the risk of loss of fraud is 
borne entirely by the issuing bank.43 
In the e-commerce context, the “card not present” rules do not apply 
because the transaction, by definition, is not conducted in person.44  In this 
context, the e-commerce retailer ultimately bears the risk of loss of fraud. 
B.  Consumer Claims for Credit Card Information Theft 
As noted above, cardholder information stolen in a data breach is fully 
reimbursed for any charges or debits made as a result of the theft.  For this 
reason, most courts have found that consumers lack standing to sue and/or 
have no ascertainable damages under various common law theories.45 
Some consumers have sought to recover costs of future credit 
monitoring, akin to claims for medical monitoring expenses in personal 
injury cases.46  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper v. Amnesty 
                                                          
 39.  VISA CORE RULES, supra note 33, § 1.11.1.2. 
 40.  Id. § 4.1.13.3. 
 41.  Id. §§ 1.10.7.1, 1.11.2. 
 42.  Id. § 1.7.4 
 43.  Id.; see also Visa Optimizes Dispute Rules, VISA, 
https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/visa-optimizes-dispute-rules-new-avenues-
for-card-not-present-mechants.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (discussing authentication 
requirements in effect as of October 17, 2015); Global Visa Card-Not-Present Merchant Guide to 
Greater Fraud Control, VISA, https://www.visa-
asia.com/ap/sg/merchants/include/Global_Card_Absent_GuideTo_Fraud_Control.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2016). 
 44.  See MacCarthy, supra note 19, at 9–10. 
 45.  See Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, supra note 10. 
 46.  See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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International USA,47 there was a circuit split concerning whether such 
claims satisfy Article III standing requirements.48  In Clapper, a case 
involving the NSA’s surveillance programs authorized by the FISA Court, 
the Supreme Court held that Article III standing requires at least “certainly 
impending” or “substantial” risk of future harm.49  It is unclear whether 
Clapper implicitly abrogates the holdings in cases that had previously 
allowed future credit monitoring claims to proceed in data breach cases.50 
Consumers have also filed claims under state consumer fraud and data 
breach reporting statutes, with varying degrees of success depending on the 
particular standing and out-of-pocket loss requirements of the statutes.51  
These cases generally do not implicate the economic loss doctrine because 
they are statutory and not common law tort claims. 
C.  Business Claims for Recovery of Expenses Related to Data Theft 
The second broad category of data breach cases is comprised of claims 
by commercial entities for losses caused by breaches of other commercial 
entities.  These cases involve quantifiable, unreimbursed out-of-pocket 
losses, so they do not usually fail on threshold Article III standing grounds. 
An important question that arises in connection with this web of 
relationships is why civil litigation would ever ensue in the first place.  The 
card networks and banks obviously are engaged in a highly lucrative 
enterprise that is designed to be self-policing.  Indeed, as discussed in Part 
III.C infra, some courts and regulators have found that aspects of the credit 
card networks can violate the antitrust laws.  It would seem exceedingly 
strange for an issuing or acquiring bank that has suffered some loss as the 
result of a credit card data breach to air this dirty laundry in  court.  The 
answer to this question may lie in several existing and emerging aspects of 
consumer credit and data security. 
First, many of the high-profile commercial cases have been filed by 
credit unions associated with pension funds and labor unions.52  The credit 
unions often issue Visa or MasterCard credit and debit cards to their 
members, but the credit unions usually do not function as issuing or 
                                                          
 47.  133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 48.  Cf. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (Article III standing not 
satisfied); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (Article III standing 
satisfied); Pisciotta, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (Article III standing satisfied). 
 49.  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147–48, n.5. 
 50.  For a discussion of this question, see Peters v. St. Joseph Serv’s Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 
847, 856, n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2015); Antman v. Uber Tech’s, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01175-LB, 2015 WL 
6123054, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015). 
 51.  See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 
1165–66 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 52.  See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 164 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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acquiring banks because they are not regulated as banks.  Nevertheless, the 
credit unions may be charged by the credit card network or the issuing bank 
with the costs of reimbursing cardholders for losses after a data breach.  If 
the party that was breached was the acquiring bank or the merchant, the 
credit union may not have any leverage or recourse under the card network 
agreements. 
Second, recent high-profile commercial cases have involved 
enormously influential national retailers such as BJ’s and Target.53  The 
size and influence of these “big box” retail chains might skew the dynamics 
of a system designed when the retail industry was far more local or 
regional, and banks correspondingly had more ability to control risk. 
Finally, at least one of the recent cases involves a third-party payment 
processor.54  As discussed in Part III.D infra, third-party payment 
processors have become a ubiquitous part of the consumer credit chain, but 
they are not banks and are not otherwise direct members of the credit card 
networks.  Parts II.B.1–3 discuss several of these recent important cases in 
which courts applied the economic loss doctrine. 
1.  The BJ’s Data Breach Litigation (2008) 
The litigation resulting from one of the first major retail data breaches, 
involving BJ’s Wholesale Club,55 provides an excellent example of the 
economic loss doctrine as applied in a data breach case.  In Sovereign Bank 
v. BJ’s, plaintiffs alleged that BJ’s had stored electronic credit card 
information in violation of the Visa Operating Regulations and that Fifth 
Third Bank, the merchant bank that processed the BJ’s transactions, failed 
to ensure BJ’s compliance with the Regulations.56  One of the plaintiffs, 
Sovereign Bank, was an issuer bank that was required to reimburse its 
cardholders for losses incurred as a result of the breach in accordance with 
the Visa cardholder agreement.57  The other plaintiff, Pennsylvania State 
Employees Credit Union (“PSECU”), also functioned as an issuer of Visa 
cards to its members and claimed that it had incurred approximately 
$98,000 in out-of-pocket expenses when it canceled and reissued its 
members’ cards that were compromised by the breach.58 
                                                          
 53.  See id.; In re Target, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1154. 
 54.  See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 
2d 566 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d in part sub nom., Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland 
Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 55.  Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 56.  Id. at 166–67.   
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
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Both Fifth Third and PSECU suffered direct, ascertainable losses as a 
result of the breach.  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, held that the plaintiffs’ negligence 
claims were barred under the economic loss doctrine.59  According to the 
Third Circuit, Pennsylvania had adopted a relatively straightforward version 
of the economic loss doctrine: “The Economic Loss Doctrine provides that 
no cause of action exists for negligence that results solely in economic 
damages unaccompanied by physical or property damage.”60 
The court rejected Sovereign Bank’s argument that Pennsylvania law 
in fact was more nuanced than this bald rule statement suggests.61  The 
Third Circuit quoted at length from a Pennsylvania Superior Court decision: 
“To allow a cause of action for negligent cause of purely economic loss 
would be to open the door to every person or business to bring a cause of 
action.  Such an outstanding burden is clearly inappropriate and a danger to 
our economic system.”62 
Similarly, the Third Circuit rejected PSECU’s argument that 
Pennsylvania had modified its economic loss doctrine in later case law.63  In 
addition, the court waived off PSECU’s argument that there was, in fact, 
physical property damage because its consumers’ compromised credit cards 
were canceled.64  According to the court, “PSECU deemed the cards useless 
not because they were damaged, but because PSECU was exposed to 
liability for unauthorized charges.”65 
The BJ’s data breach also spawned litigation that reached the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Cumis Insurance Society v. BJ’s 
Wholesale Club, Inc.66  In Cumis, claims were asserted against Fifth Third 
and BJ’s by a group of credit unions that had issued MasterCard and Visa 
cards to their members and by an insurer of the credit unions that had 
reimbursed credit union card members for fraudulent charges.67  The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ negligence claims under the economic loss 
doctrine.68  Like the court in Sovereign Bank, the Massachusetts high court 
stated the economic loss doctrine, under Massachusetts law, in stark terms: 
                                                          
 59.  Id. at 175–80. 
 60.  Id. at 175 (quoting Adams v. Copper Beach Townhome Cmtys., L.P., 816 A.2d 301, 305 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)). 
 61.  Id. at 176–77. 
 62.  Id. at 176 (quoting Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1985)). 
 63.  Id. at 180. 
 64.  Id. at 179–80. 
 65.  Id. at 180. 
 66.  918 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. 2009). 
 67.  Id. at 39. 
 68.  Id. at 46–47.   
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“In addition, the economic loss doctrine bars recovery unless the plaintiffs 
can establish that the injuries they suffered due to the defendants’ 
negligence involved physical harm or property damage, and not solely 
economic loss.”69 
The court in Cumis was even less sanguine than the Third Circuit, 
however, about third-party beneficiary claims.  The Massachusetts court 
noted that the agreement between BJ’s and Fifth Third contained a clause 
expressly disclaiming any intent to benefit third-parties.70  The court further 
concluded that the security provisions in the Visa and MasterCard operating 
regulations did not override this express disclaimer of third-party liability.71  
Rather, the court said, “nothing in the Visa and MasterCard operating 
regulations prohibits [the merchant bank and the merchant from] entering 
into agreements that explicitly exclude enforcement by third parties.”72  
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had no 
qualms about foreclosing the sort of contract remedy that could provide an 
alternative to a tort claim for economic losses.73 
2.  The Target Data Breach Litigation (2014) 
The breach of another major national retailer, Target, also spawned a 
large-scale civil class action litigation filed by consumer credit card 
holders.74  The Federal Target cases were consolidated in the District of 
Minnesota by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  That court 
subsequently heard a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.75  A portion of the 
court’s opinion considered the plaintiffs’ tort claims under the economic 
loss doctrine.76  Judge Magnuson evaluated these claims under the law of 
each state in which Target asserted that the economic loss doctrine should 
                                                          
 69.  Id. at 46 (citing Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 770 N.E.2d 447 (Mass. 2002)). 
 70.  Id. at 43–44 (quoting agreement as follows: “This Agreement is for the benefit of, and 
may be enforced only by, [Fifth Third] and [BJ’s] and their respective successors and permitted 
transferees and assignees, and is not for the benefit of, and may not be enforced by, any third-
party.”).   
 71.  Id. at 45. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  The court’s holdings in Cumis subsequently were applied by the First Circuit in the TJX 
data breach litigation.  Amerifirst Bank v. TJX Cos. (In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig.), 
564 F.3d 489, 495 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 74.  See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, (D. Minn. 
2014). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 1171–76. 
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bar the claims.77  Accordingly, the court evaluated the economic loss 
doctrine as applied to data breaches under the law of eleven jurisdictions.78 
Judge Magnuson seems to have adopted two basic principles: (1) if a 
state court or a local federal court applying state law previously held that 
the economic loss doctrine barred a data breach claim, then the motion to 
dismiss concerning that jurisdiction would be granted; but (2) absent such 
authority on point, if the relevant state law allowed tort claims for economic 
loss based on a “special relationship,” the tort-based allegations would 
survive dismissal.79  This approach seems to reflect a strained notion of 
stare decisis because most of the authorities the court relied upon were 
federal district or circuit court decisions applying or predicting state law, 
not state law itself, except for cases from Idaho, Iowa, and New Hampshire 
state courts.80  In any event, Judge Magnuson held that the economic loss 
doctrine in Alaska, California, Illinois, Iowa, and Massachusetts barred 
plaintiffs’ tort claims but that negligence claims under other state law could 
proceed.81 
3.  The Heartland Breach (2011) 
The breach of a major third-party payment processor, Heartland 
Payment systems, resulted in claims against Heartland by credit card 
customers and issuer banks in the Southern District of Texas.82  The district 
court applied New Jersey law, holding that the economic loss doctrine 
prohibited plaintiffs’ negligence claims.83  In addition to its analysis of New 
Jersey precedent, the district court noted that, under New Jersey public 
policy, “allocation of risks in accordance with [a voluntary] agreement 
better serves the public interest than an allocation achieved as a matter of 
                                                          
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.  The jurisdictions were Alaska, California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania.  Id. 
 79.  See id.  
 80.  See id. at 1173–75.  In Idaho, a state Supreme Court opinion suggested a “special 
relationship” exception to the economic loss doctrine.  Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 215 P.3d 
505 (Idaho 2009).  In Iowa, a state Supreme Court opinion refused to adopt a “special 
relationship” exception.  St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo, Ill. v. Ingram, 
841 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 2013).  In New Hampshire, in which a state Supreme Court opinion 
seemed to adopt an independent duty/special relationship exception to the doctrine.  Plourde Sand 
& Gravel Co. v. JGI E. Inc., 917 A.2d 1250 (N.H. 2007). 
 81.  Id. at 1176. 
 82.  See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 
2d 566 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d in part sub nom., Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland 
Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 83.  Id. at 585–90. 
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policy without reference to that agreement.”84  The district court stated that 
this view “is consistent with the approach of the federal government and 
most states, which generally have avoided regulating risk allocations in the 
payment-card industry except to cap consumers’ liability.”85  According to 
the district court, federal and state law, including New Jersey law, regulates 
credit card consumer privacy but not security, suggesting that the allocation 
of risks relating to security should be left to private bargaining.86  The 
district court, therefore, dismissed plaintiffs’ negligence claim.87 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed.88  The 
appellate court agreed that New Jersey law encoded a broad public policy 
favoring contract principles and private bargaining for the allocation of 
purely economic risk.89  However, the court also noted that New Jersey law 
suspends the economic loss doctrine and imposes a “duty of care to take 
reasonable measures to avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside 
from physical injury, to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an 
identifiable class with respect to whom [the] defendant knows or has reason 
to know are likely to suffer such damages from its conduct . . . .”90  The 
Fifth Circuit further recited the principles for determining whether a class of 
plaintiffs is “identifiable” under New Jersey law: the class “must be 
particularly foreseeable in terms of the type of persons or entities 
comprising the class, the certainty or predictability of their presence, the 
approximate numbers of those in the class, as well as the type of economic 
expectations disrupted.”91  Where application of these factors is unclear, the 
court should “draw upon notions of fairness, common sense and morality to 
fix the line limiting liability as a matter of public policy, rather than an 
uncritical application of the principle of particular foreseeability.”92 
                                                          
 84.  Id. at 589 (quoting Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 671 
(N.J. 1985)). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 590. 
 88.  Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421, 422 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 89.  Id. at 423–24.  The Fifth Circuit also quoted Spring Motors, as follows: 
Generally speaking, tort principles, such as negligence, are better suited for resolving claims 
involving unanticipated physical injury, particularly those arising out of an accident.  Contract 
principles, on the other hand, are generally more appropriate for determining claims for 
consequential damage that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their agreement. 
Id. at 424 (quoting Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 672). 
 90.  Id. at 424 (quoting People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 
116 (N.J. 1985)). 
 91.  Id. (quoting People Express, 495 A.2d at 116). 
 92.  Id.  
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Applying these principles to the issuer banks’ claims, the Fifth Circuit 
stated that “[t]he identities, nature, and number of the victims are easily 
foreseeable, as the Issuer Banks are the very entities to which Heartland 
sends payment card information.”93  The court further stated that “in the 
absence of a tort remedy, the Issuer Banks would be left with no remedy for 
Heartland’s alleged negligence, defying ‘notions of fairness, common sense 
and morality.’”94  The court thought it “unclear” whether the payment 
processor, Heartland, was a contractual participant in the Visa and 
MasterCard networks or whether the Issuer Banks had any bargaining 
power in relation to Heartland.95  Therefore, the court concluded, “it is not 
clear that the allocation of risk ‘could have been the subject of . . . 
negotiations’ between the Issuer Banks and Heartland by way of contracts 
with Visa and MasterCard.”96  The appellate court, therefore, reversed the 
dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim on the pleadings.97 
The trial and appellate court opinions in the Heartland litigation are 
interesting on the doctrinal, policy, and factual levels.  Doctrinally, these 
opinions raise questions, and provide conflicting answers, about the 
availability and applicability of a “special relationship” exception to the 
economic loss doctrine.  Concerning public policy, they raise questions, and 
provide conflicting answers, about bargaining power and risk allocation 
among various entities in the consumer credit chain.  At the factual level, 
the trial and appellate courts seem to have held different perceptions about 
what kind of entity Heartland was, which may have colored their different 
approaches to doctrine and policy. 
  
                                                          
 93.  Id. at 426 (citing People Express, 495 A.2d at 116). 
 94.  Id. (first quoting People Express, 495 A.2d at 116; and then citing Carter Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Grp., Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994)). 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 97.  Id. at 427. 
 950 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:935 
As noted in Part II.A supra, the “typical” credit card network is a four-
party or three-party network.  In Heartland, however, another entity, with 
an unclear relationship to the acquirer bank, stood between the issuer bank 
and the merchant: 
 
At first blush, it appears that the “payment processor,” Heartland Payment 
Systems, is related to the acquirer bank, Heartland Bank, but the Fifth 
Circuit apparently was unwilling to delve into this factual question in 
connection with a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.  In fact, Heartland 
Payment Systems is an independent payment processor and was not related 
to Heartland Bank, which has since been acquired by another bank.  
Moreover, the presence of an independent payment processor in the 
consumer credit card chain is not unusual.  As discussed in Part III infra, 
the details of the credit card payment system, including the role of 
independent payments processors, should have significant consequences for 
how courts apply the economic loss doctrine in data breach cases. 
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III.  THE POLICY AND ECONOMICS OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
APPLIED TO DATA BREACHES 
A.  The Policy and Economics of the Economic Loss Doctrine 
1.  Economic Loss, Boundaries, and Foreseeability 
The economic loss doctrine is traditionally invoked to define the 
boundary between tort and contract law.98  The effort to draw this line has 
been justified by the belief that risks and benefits are allocated more 
efficiently through private ordering than by public legal regulation.99  One 
important economic rationale for this boundary function is that it places the 
risk of loss on the party best able to insure against the risk.100  However, 
courts often apply the economic loss doctrine as a boundary marker in favor 
of private ordering even when the insurance rationale does not apply.101  In 
such cases, perhaps in most cases, the doctrine may simply reflect a policy 
or ideological judgment against governmental regulation.102  Stated more 
positively, the economic loss doctrine may help negotiate whether a given 
set of social relationships is better suited to a contract, tort, property, or 
negligence law “paradigm.”103 
The Kinsman cases are a classic pair of cases used by torts professors 
to introduce the economic loss doctrine in relation to general tort concepts 
of foreseeability.104  Those cases resulted when a barge broke loose from its 
improperly secured moorings on the icy Buffalo River and crashed into a 
second barge, which also broke its moorings.105  The two barges were swept 
downriver until they collided with the Michigan Avenue Bridge in 
Buffalo.106  The resulting pileup of barges and ice cased the river to 
overflow and flood private property surrounding the bridge.107  The court 
had little problem finding that the flooding was a foreseeable result of the 
first barge-owner’s negligence in improperly securing its moorings and 
awarded tort damages to the property owners.108 
                                                          
 98.  See Johnson, supra note 17, at 546. 
 99.  Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 
817 (2006). 
 100.  See Johnson, supra note 17, at 544–45. 
 101.  Id. at 544–59. 
 102.  Feinman, supra note 99, at 825–26. 
 103.  William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1210–11 (1994). 
 104.  In re Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman I), 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964); In re Kinsman 
Transit Co. (Kinsman II), 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 105.  Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 711–14. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 714 
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The ships meant to deliver wheat to a grain elevator downstream from 
the bridge, however, did not fare as well in court.109  The mess at the bridge 
impeded river traffic for two months and delayed grain shipments to the 
elevator, resulting in economic losses to the plaintiffs.110  Here the court 
drew a line:  the purely economic losses, although surely within the chain of 
actual causation resulting from the first barge owner’s negligence, were not 
reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of proximate causation.111  The 
court stated that, “we hesitate to accept the ‘negligent interference with 
contract’ doctrine in the absence of satisfactory reasons for differentiating 
contractual rights from other interests which the law protects.”112  However, 
applying ordinary tort principles of foreseeability, the court held that the 
economic losses were too speculative or remote to permit recovery.113 
The Kinsman cases are wonderfully illustrative because they literally 
involve a stream—actually a large river—of causality.  Negligence happens 
“upstream” and causes results “downstream.”  How far “downstream” does 
liability in tort extend?  All the way to the harbor?  Out the harbor and 
across the sea?  No: the Michigan Avenue Bridge itself literally supplies the 
“bridge” between torts and private ordering.  Once that bridge is crossed, 
there is no tort remedy.  But how can we determine when we are about to 
cross the bridge?  It may only reflect, as Justice Andrews stated in his 
famous Palsgraf dissent in relation to proximate cause, a matter “of 
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice” through which 
“the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain 
point.”114 
It is interesting that the court in Kinsman II eschewed a bald 
formulation of an economic loss doctrine (which it called the “negligent 
interference with contract” principle) in favor of general foreseeability 
principles.  This tension illustrates that courts as well as commentators have 
had difficulty articulating exactly what the economic loss doctrine is and 
precisely what function it serves in tort law beyond the general concept of 
foreseeability. 
                                                          
 109.  Kinsman II, 338 F.2d 821. 
 110.  Id. at 823–24. 
 111.  Id. at 825.  The court quoted Judge Andrews’ formulation of the proximate cause rule 
from the Palsgraf case: “It is all a question of expediency. . . .  of fair judgment, always keeping in 
mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping 
with the general understanding of mankind.”  Id. (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 
99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)). 
 112.  Id. at 823. 
 113.  Id. at 823–24. 
 114.  Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 2016] CYBERSECURITY AND THE PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY  953 
2.  Economic Loss and Externalities 
A more robust economic explanation for the economic loss doctrine 
relates to the concept of externalities.115  Tort-based liability rules can be 
viewed as a mechanism for correcting market failures.116  If an activity 
imposes costs only on its producer and confers benefits only on its 
consumer, then the producer and consumer can agree on an appropriate 
market exchange.  If the activity also imposes costs or confers benefits on 
third parties other than the producer and consumer, there is an “externality” 
or “spillover.”117  Externalities do not necessarily result in net economic 
inefficiency.  For example, the price of the original transaction might be 
adjusted by the market to reflect the costs or benefits of the externality, or 
markets may arise in which the right to impose externalities can be bought 
and sold.118 
But in many cases, such market corrections are impossible, often 
because transactions costs are excessive.119  The tort system then serves as a 
replacement for an externalities market.120  The cost of tort liability forces 
the party imposing negative externalities to internalize those costs.  This 
economic efficiency function thereby feeds into tort law deterrence and 
risk-spreading rationales.  If a party imposing negative externalities knows 
that it is liable for those costs, it will take reasonable precautions and/or 
obtain insurance, and the costs of those precautions and/or insurance will be 
reflected in the exchange between the producer and consumer.121 
Many cases of private economic loss do not reflect a net cost to society 
and therefore do not represent externalities.122  Consider, for example, the 
following prototypical case: A negligent driver crashes into another car on a 
highway, injuring the driver of the second car and closing the highway until 
the debris is cleared.  Because the highway is closed, a truck carrying 
bananas is unable to reach the local food store, and as a result, a customer 
who comes to the store looking to purchase bananas finds the store’s 
banana display empty.  The driver of the second car could recover damages 
relating to his physical injuries against the negligent driver of the first car.  
But the economic loss doctrine would prohibit the store from recovering 
these lost banana sales from the negligent driver, even though actual 
causation could be established. 
                                                          
 115.  See generally W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). 
 116.  Id. at 3–4. 
 117.  See id. at 3. 
 118.  See id. at 4. 
 119.  See id.  
 120.  See id. 
 121.  See id. 
 122.  Id. 
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One economic rationale for this result is that the store’s individual 
economic losses probably do not represent a social cost.  The customer 
presumably could purchase her bananas at a different store, in which case 
the overall market would remain in equilibrium: the consumer would still 
have her bananas and the revenue would simply have shifted from the first 
store to the second.123  In other words, the market efficiently soaks up 
potential externalities. 
It is possible to imagine cases in which the market cannot efficiently 
soak up potential externalities.  Even the simple example given above does 
not account for the customer’s increased transaction costs in finding and 
traveling to a new store with bananas in stock.  If those costs were 
significant, the customer’s desire to obtain bananas might be frustrated, and 
the loss of this transaction might represent a social cost.  In such a case, 
there is an economic argument in favor of allowing a tort claim by the first 
store against the negligent driver to recover its lost revenue.  Of course, 
litigation over the cost of a few bananas would be prohibitively expensive, 
so we need not fear an inefficient litigation explosion over trivial cases.  
But where the stakes are high enough, a tort remedy might provide the most 
efficient result, particularly over the long term as repeated tort cases 
encourage greater care and risk spreading through insurance. 
Transaction costs are likely to increase in relation to the extent the 
frustrated expectations of the original parties were unique or special.  In the 
example of the bananas, the customer does not have any sort of unique or 
special relationship with the trucking company or the grocer.  Bananas are 
essentially a commodity, and the customer can easily find a replacement if 
her expectation of purchasing bananas at the first grocer are frustrated.  
There is nothing unique or special about the customer’s relationship to the 
grocer, the trucking company, or the negligent driver.  The possibility of a 
“special” relationship that might produce an exception to the economic loss 
doctrine leads to the next Part. 
B.  “Exceptions” to the Economic Loss Doctrine 
The word “exceptions” is in quotation marks in this Part’s heading 
because the economic loss doctrine is not really a “rule” with “exceptions.”  
Some courts and commentators refer to it as the economic loss rule, but this 
Article has avoided that terminology on purpose.  It is better thought of as a 
general principle that may or may not apply in light of other applicable 
principles. 
                                                          
 123.  See id. at 4–6.   
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Many of these principles were recognized in the proposed Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm.124  This proposed 
Restatement has proven controversial, although portions of it have been 
approved by the ALI membership.125  The proposed Restatement, in Section 
1, recognizes that, “[a]n actor has no general duty to avoid the unintentional 
infliction of economic loss on another,” but specifies circumstances under 
which such a duty could arise.126  Comment c. to Section 1 acknowledges 
that a general duty to avoid economic losses could lead to indeterminate 
and disproportionate liability and that courts should usually defer to 
contractual arrangements because “[r]isks of economic loss tend to be 
especially well suited to allocation by contract.”127 
In particular, Comment c. to Section 1 suggests that a person entering 
into a transaction “has a full chance to consider how to manage the risks 
involved, whether by inspecting the item or investment, obtaining insurance 
against the risk of disappointment, or making a contract that assigns the risk 
of loss to someone else.”128  Further, Comment c. recognizes that if 
insurance benefits, indemnity payments, or other agreed upon monetary 
payments are allocated pursuant to an agreement, the injured party is made 
whole.129  Finally, Comment c. notes that the parties are usually in a better 
position ex ante to determine an appropriate allocation of risks and 
responsibilities than a court would be ex post, and an ex post judicial 
determination also involves additional social costs of adjudication.130  
Nevertheless, Comment e. suggests that “[a] court should not labor under a 
presumption against liability when the rationales for restricting it are 
absent.”131 
Consistent with Section 1 and its Comments c. and e., Section 3 of the 
proposed Restatement states that, “[e]xcept as provided elsewhere in this 
Restatement, there is no liability in tort for economic loss caused by 
negligence in the performance or negotiation of a contract between the 
                                                          
 124.  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012) [hereinafter PROPOSED RESTATEMENT DRAFT NO. 1]. 
 125.  See Vincent R. Johnson, The Vast Domain of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 1 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. FORUM 29 (2010); Restatement of the Law, Third, Torts: Liability for Economic 
Harm, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/torts-liability-economic-harm-3rd/. 
 126.  PROPOSED RESTATEMENT DRAFT NO. 1, supra note 124, §§ 1(a)–(b).  The Comment to 
this Section notes that, “[s]ubsection (a) states a more limited principle [than the economic loss 
rule]: not that liability for economic loss is generally precluded, but that duties of care with respect 
to economic loss are not general in character; they are recognized in specific circumstances.”  Id. 
§ 1 cmt. b. 
 127.  Id. § 1 cmt. c. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. § 1 cmt. e. 
 956 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:935 
parties.”132  One of the provisos is relatively uncontroversial because it is 
already embedded in substantial existing case law: professional negligence 
(Section 4).133  A proviso on negligent misrepresentation (Section 5) is 
more controversial because it takes a position on a disputed body of case 
law.134  A third proviso is even more controversial:  “negligent performance 
of services” (Section 6).135  The proviso for negligent performance of 
services states that, 
[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession, or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a 
pecuniary interest, performs a service for the benefit of others, is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their 
reliance upon the service, if he fails to exercise reasonable care in 
performing it.136 
Liability would be limited to loss suffered by “the person or one of a 
limited group of persons for whose benefit the actor performs the service” 
and “through reliance upon it in a transaction that the actor intends to 
influence.”137  The illustrations to this first draft of Section 6 are interesting 
for our discussion of data breach cases.138 
Illustration 1 involves an accountant hired by a limited partnership to 
provide auditing services, which are performed negligently.139  The limited 
partners individually rely on the services.140  The accountant would be 
liable to the limited partners because they relied on the representations and 
expertise of the accountant.141 
Illustration 5 involves a mechanic who negligently services a 
machine.142  The machine’s owner then sells it to a buyer, who 
subsequently learns it must be repaired.  If the mechanic was hired by the 
original owner for his own benefit, the mechanic would not be liable in 
negligence to the buyer.  If the mechanic was hired by the original owner as 
a condition of the sale, however, the mechanic would be liable to the buyer 
in negligence because the buyer relied on the mechanic’s work.143 
                                                          
 132.  Id. § 3. 
 133.  Id. § 4. 
 134.  Id. § 5. 
 135.  Id. § 6. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. § 6 illus. 1–6. 
 139.  Id. § 6 illus. 1. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id.  The reporter’s note states that this illustration is based on White v. Guarente, 372 
N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977).  Id. § 6 reporter’s note a. 
 142.  Id. § 6 illus. 5.   
 143.  Id.  The reporter’s note states that this illustration is based on Ramerth v. Hart, 983 P.2d 
848 (Idaho 1999).  Id. § 6 reporter’s note a. 
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Illustration 6 involves a builder who negligently constructs a chimney 
on a home.144  The homeowner subsequently sells the home to a buyer.  
After the sale, the chimney damage becomes evident and requires repair.  
The builder would not be liable to the subsequent buyer because the buyer 
would have had ample opportunity to conduct any inspections before 
closing and to adjust the purchase price accordingly and/or to include 
adjustments for latent defects in the sale contract. 
A similar dynamic is reflected in Section 6 of the proposed 
Restatement (Third).145  That Section states that there is liability for 
negligent performance of a service that causes pecuniary loss to others if the 
loss is “suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for 
whose benefit the actor performs the service; and (b) through reliance upon 
it in a transaction the actor intends to influence.”146 
This Section would “not recognize liability for negligence in the 
course of negotiating or performing a contract between the parties.”147  The 
illustrations include an accountant hired by a limited partnership who 
makes representations that are relied upon by the limited partners, a lawyer 
who represents both buyer and seller in a transaction, a realtor who works 
for the seller but arranges for a home inspection on the buyer’s behalf, and 
the machine mechanic illustration from Section 3.148 
Comment b. to Section 6 covers “three-cornered construction 
disputes.”149  The example provided is a construction project owner who 
hires an architect and a builder, who have no contract with each other.150  
The architect’s negligent design causes the builder to suffer pecuniary 
losses.151  The proposed Restatement (Third) would recognize tort liability 
under these circumstances.152  The Comment notes that if the default tort 
liability rule’s “allocation of responsibility is not congenial to the parties, 
they are free to change it in the contracts that link them.”153 
Data breach cases in the consumer credit card industry seem to fall 
somewhere between Illustrations 1 and 6 to Section 3 and in some ways 
                                                          
 144.  Id. § 6 illus. 6.  The reporter’s note states that this illustration is based on Redarowicz v. 
Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1982), although the note indicates there is a division of authority 
on the question.  See id. § 6 reporter’s note c. 
 145.  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 6 (AM. LAW. INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014).   
 146.  Id. §§ 6(2)(a)–(b). 
 147.  Id. § 6(4). 
 148.  Id. § 6 illus. 1–3, 5. 
 149.  Id. § 6 cmt. b. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
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seem to resemble the liability scenario under Illustration 5 to both Sections 
3 and 6 of the proposed Restatement (Third).  None of the parties in the 
credit card finance chain are “hired” by the other parties to perform any 
particular services, but there is a sense in which each party relies on the 
other to meet minimum network security standards.154  One of the 
conditions for any party of entering into a credit card network relationship 
is the belief that all of the commercial parties involved will take efforts to 
secure the network from data breaches.  If the mechanic who services a 
machine as a condition of the sale can be liable to the buyer in negligence, a 
bank, merchant, or card brand that supplies network security as a condition 
of every other party’s participation in the network might be liable in 
negligence as well. 
However, the use of the term “condition” here—a term that does not 
appear in the illustrations to the proposed Restatement (Third) we have been 
discussing—complicates the analysis.  In the mechanic’s case (Illustration 5 
discussed supra), for example, it is unclear why the buyer should not be 
required to specify the mechanical services as a condition of the sale and 
obtain a warranty and indemnity or otherwise to agree on a sale price that 
reflects some degree of uncertainty about the efficacy of the seller’s 
mechanic’s work. 
If there is an answer to this question, in economic terms, it must relate 
to the extent to which there are any externalities imposed by the transaction 
and if so, whether they are effectively internalized by contract.  If the 
negligence would be hard to detect in a timely fashion, or the potential loss 
hard to account for or insure against efficiently by agreement, negligence 
law could perhaps fill the gap.  Many of the examples noted above are cases 
in which courts have recognized a “special relationship” of a fiduciary or 
quasi-fiduciary nature between the tortfeasor and the damaged party.155  
These have included cases involving, for example, auditors, surveyors, 
inspectors, engineers, attorneys, notaries public, architects, weighers, and 
telegraph companies.156  These are circumstances under which ordinary 
contract principles sometimes do not apply because one party is in a 
position to have special knowledge or power that the other party does not 
possess.  These kinds of asymmetries in information or power are precisely 
the sorts of circumstances that are likely to produce externalities.157 
                                                          
 154.  For a discussion of credit card payment systems as “weakest link” networks in terms of 
security, see infra, Part III.B.3.  
 155.  See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985). 
 156.  See id. at 117–18 and cases cited therein. 
 157.  See, e.g., Sujit Chakravorti, Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theory and 
Evidence, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI., POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPER 2009-8, at 3 (Nov. 18, 2009), 
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/policy-discussion-papers/2009/pdp-8. 
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Data breaches involving consumer credit cards can also resemble the 
three-cornered construction disputes referenced in Comment b. to Section 6 
of the proposed Restatement (Third) when a third-party payment processor 
is involved.  The third-party payment processor has a contractual 
relationship with the merchant and/or the acquiring bank but does not have 
contractual relationships with the issuing bank, the cardholder, or any other 
party such as a credit union card issuer.  Once again, the economic issue is 
whether any externalities imposed by the payment processor’s negligence 
are internalized by contract.  The fact that the injured parties are not in 
contractual privity with the payment processor suggests a default tort 
liability rule might be appropriate. 
C.  The Externalities of Consumer Credit Card Data Breaches 
So what are the externalities, if any, of a data breach involving 
consumer credit card information, and how difficult are they to account for 
by agreement?  As we have seen, most of the recent high profile data breach 
incidents that have resulted in mass tort litigation arose in the “big box” 
retail context and involved the theft of consumer credit card data.  A 
growing variety of cyber threats involve types of malware called “RAM 
scrapers” that are able to capture credit card stripe data housed temporarily 
in the random access memory of computer systems used by retailers to 
process payments.158  This vulnerability made big box retailers who process 
enormous volumes of credit card transactions attractive targets for cyber 
criminals.159 
As we have also seen, consumer credit card networks operate within a 
web of contractual relationships.  These provisions in the Visa Core Rules 
appear to represent an extensive effort to adjust the risks of data breaches 
and fraud among all participants in the network.  It is hard to imagine a 
clearer circumstance in which potential externalities are internalized by 
sophisticated parties.  It seems, then, that the economic loss doctrine should 
bar tort claims between any of the parties for all costs relating to a data 
breach. 
Nevertheless, something seems intuitively unsatisfying about this 
result.  In the not too distant past, instances of identity theft and credit card 
counterfeiting were confined to discrete cases.  Such activity has scaled 
exponentially with the advent of mass cybercrime.  An important reason 
why is precisely because the credit card networks are networks. 
                                                          
 158.  See Brian Riley, Ram Scraper Malware: Why PCI DSS Can’t Fix Retail (July 23, 2014), 
INFO. WK. DARK READING, http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/ram-scraper-malware-
why-pci-dss-cant-fix-retail/a/d-id/1297501. 
 159.  Id. 
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1.  Network Externalities Generally 
The consumer credit card networks, concentrated into two major 
providers (Visa and MasterCard), and three secondary providers (American 
Express, Discover, and Diners Club), comprise an essential component of 
the world’s economic infrastructure.  There are over two billion issued Visa 
cards worldwide and over one hundred fifty million transactions are 
processed over the Visa network every day.160  As a primer on cyberdefense 
on Visa’s website states, “[i]t is impossible to overstate the threat posed by 
cyber attacks . . . .”161  Another video on Visa’s website notes that the 
payment network “has got to be like a light switch—like electricity, like 
water” and “it’s so important when we’re talking about money, right, about 
people’s lives.”162  If the consumer credit card system were compromised 
on a large scale, the negative spillover effects could be enormous. 
The concentration of the card payment networks is a form of network 
externality.163  A network externality arises when a network is valuable to 
users based not only on its features and performance, but also on its size.164  
A network externality can lead to lower investment in features and 
performance, including in the area of security.  As Ross Anderson and 
Tyler Moore note, “[p]ut simply, while a platform vendor is building 
market dominance, it must appeal to vendors of complementary products as 
well as to its direct customers; not only does this divert energy that might 
be spent on securing the platform, but security could get in the way by 
                                                          
 160.  See VisaNet: Catalyst for Commerce, VISA (2013), 
https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/corporate/media/visanet-technology/VisaNet-
Network-Processing-Overview.pdf; A day in the life of VisaNet, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/about-
visa/visanet.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2016); VisaNet: by the numbers, VISA 
https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/corporate/media/visanet-technology/visa-net-fact-
sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2016); VISA, VisaNet—An Electronic Payment Processing 
Network, YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2011), https://youtu.be/XntlmMj-Jyk. 
 161.  Ellen Richey, Breaking Down Barriers to Cyberdefense Through Congressional Action, 
VISA, https://usa.visa.com/visa-everywhere/security/breaking-down-barriers-to-
cyberdefense.html. 
 162.  VisaNet, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/about-visa/visanet.html#1 (last visited Feb. 12, 
2016). 
 163.  See Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of Information Security, 314 SCI. 
610, 611 (2006); Bruce J. Summers, Fraud Containment, ECON. PERSP., 1Q/2009, at 17, 18, 
https://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2009/ep_1qtr2009
_part3_summers.pdf (stating that “[f]rom the perspective of economic analysis . . . payment 
systems and markets are thought of as special because they entail something called ‘network 
effects’ and ‘two-sided’ services, which are characteristic of public goods.  Payment markets, 
moreover, may not always function like perfect markets because of the presence of 
‘externalities . . . .’”).   
 164.  See Anderson & Moore, supra note 163. 
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making life harder for the complementers.”165  In fact, there has been 
significant antitrust litigation relating to the credit card networks, which 
suggests that the system as a whole entails public goods issues.166 
In the early and mid-1980s, there were two significant private antitrust 
cases against Visa.167  In the first case, a third-party payment processor, 
NaBanco, unsuccessfully challenged Visa’s interchange fees.168  The trial 
court upheld these fees under the rule of reason, and the judgment was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.169  The second 
case arose after Sears, Roebuck and Co. began issuing its own card, the 
Discover Card, while also seeking to offer cards within the Visa network 
through an affiliate.170  Visa had adopted a rule that excluded from the Visa 
network the affiliates of firms that offered cards “deemed competitive” to 
Visa.171  A jury found that this restriction violated antitrust law, and the 
verdict was upheld by the trial court.172  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, however, reversed the verdict, finding that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that Visa’s exclusionary rule unlawfully precluded 
entry of new credit card bands into the general credit card market.173 
The NaBanco and MountainWest cases, however, were not the last 
word on antitrust in the credit card industry.  The U.S. Department of 
Justice brought a civil antitrust case against Visa and MasterCard in 2000, 
and in early 2015 the Justice Department along with the Attorneys General 
of seventeen states brought another civil antitrust case against Visa, 
MasterCard, and American Express.174 
In the 2000 case, the Justice Department alleged that some of Visa and 
MasterCard’s governance rules and exclusionary practices violated section 
1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.175  Most significantly for the purpose of 
                                                          
 165.  Id.  Anderson and Moore suggest that “platform vendors commonly ignore security in the 
beginning, as they are building their market position; later, once they have captured a lucrative 
market, they add excessive security in order to lock their customers in tightly.”  Id.  
 166.  See Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit Card 
Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 667 (1995). 
 167.  Nat’l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 
1984), aff’d, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986); SCFC ILC, Inc., v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 
956 (D. Utah 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 168.  NaBanco, 596 F. Supp. at 1263. 
 169.  Nat’l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
 170.  SCFC ILC, Inc., v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.   SCFC ILC, Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 990.  
 173.  SCFC ILC, Inc., 36 F.3d at 963–72. 
 174.  United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 
229 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 175.  U.S. v. Visa, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 327. 
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this Article, after a thirty-four day trial, the district court found that there 
were significant barriers to entry in the relevant product markets and that 
both Visa and MasterCard possessed market power.176  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit subsequently affirmed these findings.177 
In the 2015 case, the Justice Department and the States alleged that the 
card networks’ “anti-steering” rules violated section 1 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.178  These rules prohibited merchants from steering customers 
towards a competitor’s cards through advertising, discounts, or 
otherwise.179  Visa and MasterCard entered into consent decrees prior to 
trial, but American Express and a related entity, American Express Travel 
Related Services Company, elected to litigate.180  After a lengthy trial, the 
court found that American Express’ “anti-steering” rules violated the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.181  Again, the most significant part of this decision 
for the purpose of this Article is the court’s treatment of market definition 
and market power.  American Express argued that the separate “network 
services” and “card” markets defined in the 2000 Visa case should be 
collapsed into a single, larger market.182  The court rejected this argument 
and reiterated the approach in the 2000 Visa case that card network services 
is a separate product market.183  The court further found that, “[d]efendants 
enjoy significant market share in a highly concentrated market with high 
barriers to entry and are able to exercise uncommon leverage over their 
merchant-consumers due to the amplifying effect of cardholder insistence 
and derived demand.”184  The court noted that the network services market 
remained highly concentrated with significant entry barriers despite the 
fifteen years that had passed between the decisions”185  In particular, the 
court found, “American Express is one of only four major suppliers of 
GPCC card network services, and three of the competitors in this market 
(Visa, American Express, and MasterCard) are significantly larger than the 
fourth (Discover).”186  The court further found that new digital payment 
methods, including PayPal, Square, and Google Wallet had not diluted the 
                                                          
 176.  Id. at 335, 341–42. 
 177.  United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238–39 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 178.  U.S. v. Am. Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 149. 
 179.  See id. at 149–50. 
 180.  Id. at 149. 
 181.  Id. at 150–51. 
 182.  Id. at 171–72.  
 183.  Id. at 173–74. 
 184.  Id. at 188.  “Cardholder insistence” is the notion that cardholders insist that merchants 
accept certain cards, including American Express.  See id. at 191.  In more traditional antitrust 
economics terms, it is a kind of network effect. 
 185.  Id. at 189. 
 186.  Id. 
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major networks’ market power, but rather “piggyback on existing methods 
of payment.”187 
These findings concerning market definition and market power in both 
the 2000 and 2015 credit card network antitrust cases, of course, were hotly 
contested.  Nevertheless, the consensus in the academic literature 
concerning credit card network economics is that the industry is highly 
concentrated and entails high barriers to entry due to network effects.188 
2.  Network Externalities Relating to Fraud and Liability Protection 
Sujit Chakravorti, a senior economist with the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago, has identified multiple kinds of potential externalities in 
payment card networks, including externalities relating to card adoption and 
usage, merchant competition, instrument-contingent pricing, network 
competition, surplus from revolvers, merchant fees and consumer credit, 
competition among payment instruments, and dynamic efficiency and 
innovation.189  Most significantly for our purposes, Chakravorti notes that 
there are potential externalities relating to “payment fraud and liability” in 
card networks.190 
The potential network externalities of fraud and liability shifting, 
Chakravorti observes, “ha[ve] received little attention in the payment 
network literature.”191  He briefly identifies two problems:  (1) the zero 
liability policy could result in consumers taking inadequate fraud 
precautions; and (2) individual merchants and payment processors might 
not have adequate incentives to take precautions, and “while the cost of not 
protecting payment information for an individual entity may be small, its 
impact on the system as a whole may be significant.”192  Chakravorti notes 
that the proposed solutions to these problems by industry participants have 
included better enforcement of existing fraud laws and greater adoption of 
voluntary industry-wide security standards.193 Other commentators, 
Chakravorti states, have suggested the promulgation of authoritative 
standards by governments, voluntary or mandatory information sharing 
                                                          
 187.  Id. at 190. 
 188.  There is robust debate in the literature, however, concerning whether specific industry 
policies, such as the charging of interchange fees, have anticompetitive effects.  See, e.g., 
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 189.  Id. at 5–20. 
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concerning breach incidents, and governmental response plans for wide-
scale fraud.194 
Stacey Schreft, an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, has similarly noted that, although perfect security is unobtainable 
without destroying the social value of electronic payment systems, market 
forces alone cannot achieve an efficient amount of security.195  Schreft 
argues that, “[b]ecause asymmetric information and externalities are 
associated with the transfer and use of PII in making payments, the full cost 
of an act of identity theft will not be borne by those best positioned to 
prevent the theft, giving them too little incentive to protect against the 
crime.”196  Schreft further states that, “payment system integrity and 
efficiency are public goods—goods that markets tend to underproduce even 
in the absence of identity theft.”197 
One of the market failures Schreft identifies in relation to identity theft 
results from asymmetric information.198  Schreft suggests that, 
“[a]symmetric information prevents customers from differentiating between 
sellers based on security practices.  This forces customers instead to make 
purchase decisions based on their expected degree of data security across 
sellers, discounting purchases from all sellers by the same expected cost 
from misuse of PII.”199 
Asymmetric information seems to be less of a problem in credit card 
payment networks because the industry has voluntarily adopted the PCI-
DSS standard.  Anyone who is interested can learn that PCI-DSS is the 
industry standard and can research what kind of security it provides.  
Nevertheless, as we have seen, some of the recent large-scale retail data 
breaches involve claims that one party or another in the network failed to 
follow all the requirements of PCI-DSS.  It is difficult, if not impossible, for 
any one party in the network to know with any degree of certainty whether 
another party is in fact complying with the agreed-upon standard. 
This problem is linked to network externalities, which Schreft also 
identifies as a market failure in connection with the provision of 
information security, particularly in credit card networks.200  As Schreft 
notes, 
                                                          
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Stacey L. Schreft, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Risks of Identity Theft: Can the 
Market Protect the Payment System?, ECON. REV., 4Q/2007, at 5, 22, 
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 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
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[n]etworks can adopt policies that impose minimum security 
practices or contractually assign liability for data breaches to 
improve within-network investment in security, but a network’s 
security will still be too lax if the network’s own breaches can 
impose losses on entities outside the network, including other 
networks, and the network does not bear the cost of those 
losses.201 
This problem is particularly compounded because in terms of security, 
payment system networks are “weakest link” networks.202  As Schreft 
argues, “[a] network’s security is only as effective as the security of the 
weakest link—the participant most likely to experience a data breach.”203  
These externalities, Schreft concludes, pose risks to the integrity and 
efficiency of the payment system.204 
Schreft uses the TJX breach as an example of a case in which a 
retailer’s failure to employ adequate security imposed externalities on 
banks, with estimated costs of more than $1 billion.205  Although Schreft 
mentions that a class action lawsuit was filed by the banks, her paper was 
published before the case was resolved.  In fact, the claims against TJX that 
were litigated were rejected by the district court under both negligence and 
contractual third-party beneficiary theories.206  The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit affirmed all of these rulings, including the dismissal of the 
basic negligence claim under the economic loss doctrine, but reversed and 
remanded a negligent misrepresentation claim based on a recent case the 
district court may have overlooked.207  The First Circuit noted that “the 
[negligent misrepresentation] claim thus survives but on life support.”208  
The parties subsequently settled.209 
Schreft acknowledges that the parties in credit card networks can 
contractually assign liability among themselves, but she thinks that this 
cannot provide a comprehensive solution because “many system 
participants have access to customer payment data between the point of sale 
and final settlement, and few of them can anticipate their ultimate ties to 
each other and enter into contractual agreements that allocate the risk of 
                                                          
 201.  Id. at 5, 25.  
 202.  See Hal R. Varian, System Reliability and Free Riding, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 
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counsel fees). 
 966 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:935 
harm from others’ data security failures.”210  Schreft therefore concludes 
that public policy should require greater disclosure requirements, a public 
insurance scheme to secure the integrity of the system, and “the clear and 
comprehensive assignment of liability to address externalities.”211 
Schreft’s examination of data security risks in the payment system is 
among the most comprehensive in the economic literature.  Still, it is 
unclear whether she adequately accounts for the extensive web of 
contractual rights and duties that already encompass all parties in the major 
credit card networks.  When she discusses the contractual allocation of 
liability, Schreft seems to have in mind some sort of individualized 
negotiations focused on the specific practices of individual players.  The 
transaction costs entailed by such a requirement would grind the payment 
system to a halt.  This is why the operating regulations of the major 
networks employ generally applicable standards with liability shifting and 
arbitration provisions.  But by highlighting the weakest link and systemic 
externality problems inherent in payment system security, Schreft shows 
why contractual risk management provisions between the four immediate 
players in a consumer credit card transaction will not internalize all of the 
externalities inherent in the risk of a data breach. 
3.  Network Externalities and Distributed Networks 
The problem of security-related network externalities is further 
compounded in the consumer credit card networks because the networks are 
widely scaled and distributed.  The following diagram illustrates the 
externalities imposed on the other members of a credit card network by a 
retailer’s failure to enact adequate data security, resulting in a consumer 
credit card information breach: 
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The retailer’s failure to employ adequate security imposes costs on the 
consumer whose cardholder information is compromised.  Costs are then 
imposed on the acquirer in the form of transaction costs and on the issuer in 
the form of transaction and cardholder reimbursement costs.  If the retailer 
in fact failed to implement PCI-DSS as required by the card network 
agreement regulations, all these layers will collapse back onto the retailer.  
If the retailer complied with its requirements under the card network 
regulations, these layers will explode outward onto the issuer. 
If this was the whole story, a robust contractual network might be the 
entire answer.  We need to think of the credit card payment system, 
however, not only in terms of individual transactions, but as a distributed 
network.  Imagine millions of these nested diagrams as nodes on an 
enormous distributed network:212 
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https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Using-Synchronous-Boolean-Networks-to-Model-
Several-Phenomena-of-Collective-Behavior-pone.0115156.s003.ogv (last visited Feb. 12, 2016); 
see Stepan Kochemazov & Alexander Semenov, Using Synchronous Boolean Networks to Model 
Several Phenomena of Collective Behavior, PLOS ONE 23–25 (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0115156&re






 968 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:935 
As individual nodes implode or explode, the potential exists for the entire 
system to become destabilized.  Of course, one of the benefits of nodal 
networks is that they are to a great extent self-healing.  If an individual node 
is destroyed, the system still maintains resiliency.  But if large numbers of 
nodes are compromised in the same way at the same time, the effects could 
amplify across the entire network and the system could collapse.  Think, for 
example, of a neural network such as the human brain.  If we lose a few 
neurons, the system will likely find ways to compensate.  If a small region 
of the brain is malfunctioning, other parts may be co-opted to compensate.  
There comes a point, however, at which damage is sufficiently large or 
extensive that a cascade of failures results and the entire organ is severely 
compromised or fails.213 
These thought experiments illustrate why the metaphor of a “stream” 
of causality breaks down in a distributed nodal network.  There is no 
“stream” of causality, but rather a non-linear “web” of causes and effects, 
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running backward and forward, up and down, in and out, under and 
around.214  In one sense, this should make the duty/proximate 
cause/economic loss analysis easier: outside the immediate “proximity” of 
the breach, determining the probability of loss with any reasonable certainty 
might prove impossible.  In another sense, however, the difficulty of 
showing which affected parties are “upstream” and which are 
“downstream” of something like the Michigan Avenue Bridge could mean 
that tort law cannot perform its traditional functions of deterring 
excessively risky conduct, encouraging risk mitigation strategies, and 
adjusting the social costs of externalities. 
4.  Network Externalities and Weakest Link Networks 
Economist Hal Varian explored these issues in a 2004 paper on 
“System Reliability and Free Riding.”215  Varian suggested a taxonomy that 
included three kinds of networks in connection with system reliability: 
Total effort.  Reliability depends on the sum of the efforts exerted by 
the individuals. 
Weakest link.  Reliability depends on the minimum effort. 
Best shot.  Reliability depends on the maximum effort.216 
Varian illustrated this taxonomy with reference to a walled city: there may 
be one wall and the city’s defense may depend on the sum of the efforts of 
its builders; there may be a wall of varying height, and the city’s defense 
may depend on the wall’s viability at its lowest point; or there may be 
multiple walls but only the highest wall is the final line of defense.217 
Data security in computer networks can resemble any of these sorts of 
networks at various points in the system.  At a larger scale, however, most 
computer data systems are “weakest link” networks.   This is why so many 
reported data breaches involve “stupid” mistakes, such as individual 
employees losing or improperly discarding unencrypted storage media, lax 
password policies, unintentional software “backdoors,” and the like.218 
Varian examined each of the three types of networks in his taxonomy 
from a game-theoretic perspective.  He concluded that systems will become 
                                                          
 214.  See Anderson & Moore, supra note 163, at 613 (“Computer networks from the Internet to 
decentralized peer-to-peer networks are complex but emerge from ad hoc interactions of many 
entities using simple ground rules.  This emergent complexity, coupled with heterogeneity, is 
similar to social networks and even to the metabolic pathways in living organisms.”); MacCarthy, 
supra note 19, at 8 (noting that, in a credit card data breach, “[d]amage is not contained at one 
node of the payment network but affects other nodes”).   
 215.  Varian, supra note 202, at 1–15. 
 216.  Id. at 1. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  See, e.g., VERIZON, 2015 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT (2015), 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/. 
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“increasingly unreliable as the number of agents increases in the weakest 
link case.”219  This is not a surprising conclusion, as it is consistent with 
standard economic intuitions about agency costs and moral hazard.220  
Varian concludes that the optimal way to mitigate this risk, in asymmetric 
cases (where the parties’ value and costs for security differ), is to impose a 
negligence rule.221  The standard of care, Varian suggests, could be 
determined by the courts but might more efficiently be determined through 
insurance underwriters.222 
This analysis might suggest that the economic loss doctrine should not 
bar negligence claims in consumer data breach cases.  It is possible, 
however, to view the credit card networks as self-insuring systems.  The 
network agreements already distribute liability based on a standard of 
care—the use of PCI-DSS and the presentment and authentication 
requirements for in-person transactions. 
There are a number of problems with this analogy.  First, the consumer 
is insured absolutely without regard to any standard of care.  Second, the 
“underwriting” requirements may not be stringent enough, as evidenced by 
the prevalence of large scale breaches despite the network requirements.  
Moreover, as a related concern, the networks do not operate as objective 
insurers, but in fact possess market power and sometimes may act anti-
competitively.  Finally, there is a joker in the deck, which we have not yet 
closely examined—the widespread use of third-party payment processors 
that are not original parties to the payment network.  We turn take a closer 
look at this joker in the next Part. 
D.  Third-Party Payment Processors 
As described in Part II supra, in the case law, and the legal and 
economic literature, credit card payments typically involve three or four 
parties—the card network provider (such as Visa), the card customer, and 
one or two banks (the issuer and acquirer), all of which are part of a web of 
contractual relations.  The “typical” scenario, however, might in fact more 
often be complicated by the presence of one or more non-bank entities, in 
addition to the card networks, in the payment processing chain.  The 
Heartland breach discussed in Part II supra is an example of a case 
involving a third-party payment processor.223  As noted in the summary of 
                                                          
 219.  Varian, supra note 202, at 7.   
 220.  See, e.g., Schreft, supra note 195. 
 221.  Varian, supra note 202, at 10. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 
2d 566 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d in part sub nom., Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland 
Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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that case, on the record before it, the Fifth Circuit was unable to make any 
clear findings about Heartland Payment Systems’ liability. 
In a recent report, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City noted that, 
“[n]onbanks are pervasive in the U.S. payment system.”224  In addition to 
the credit card networks themselves, the Report includes numerous other 
nonbank activities relating to the credit card payment chain, such as fraud 
system vendors, online transaction security systems, hardware providers, 
software providers, card-issuer processors, card merchant processors, 
internet banking platform providers, and P2P internet payment providers.225  
According to the Report, “[o]ne of the largest card-related activities is card-
issuer processing,” and “[t]wo nonbanks, First Data and TSYS, dominate 
this market.”226  The Report states that First Data has more than 300 million 
accounts and TSYS has more than 250 million accounts, and that together 
they provide processing services for nearly forty percent of all credit card 
accounts.227 
Third-party payment processors such as First Data can provide 
services for the merchant and/or issuer in transactions that travel over the 
card brand network (for example, the VISA network).  The following 
illustration from the 2003 Federal Reserve Report illustrates this type of 
transaction:228 
                                                          
 224.  Terri Bradford, Matt Davies & Stuart E. Weiner, NONBANKS IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM 
1 (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2003), 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/psr/bksjournarticles/nonbankpaper.pdf. 
 225.  Id. at 5–6.  Significant companies listed in the Report in these categories include 
Thomson Financial (http://thomsonreuters.com/en/products-services/financial.html), Bridger 
Systems (http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/products/bridger-insight.aspx), Diebold 
(http://www.diebold.com/), Fiserv (https://www.fiserv.com/index.aspx), First Data 
(https://www.firstdata.com/en_us/home.html), TSYS (http://tsys.com/), Concord 
(http://www.concordmerchant.com/index.php/content/payment/), Paypal 
(https://www.paypal.com/home), and others. 
 226.  Id. at 8.   
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. at 24. 
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Third-party processors can also provide network services in lieu of the 
card brand’s network.229  The following diagram from the 2003 Federal 




In its most recent 10-K filing, First Data states that it provides services to 
merchants in approximately 3.9 million locations throughout the United 
States and that it “acquired $1.7 trillion of payment transaction dollar 
volume on behalf of U.S. merchants in 2014.”231  In its 2014 Annual 
Report, TSYS states that it processed 17.8 billion transactions in 2014, 
including thirty-five percent of the purchase volume within the top-50 U.S. 
Visa and MasterCard issuers.232  In the “Risk Factors” portion of its 10-K, 
First Data notes that, “we process and store sensitive business information 
and personal consumer information in order to provide our services” and 
that “our position in the global payments industry may attract hackers to 
conduct attacks on our systems that could compromise the security of our 
data.  In addition, the increasing sophistication level of cyber criminals may 
increase the risk of a security breach of our systems.”233 
The importance of third-party payment processors obviously increases 
the risk of failure in a “weakest link” network.  As a joint report of the 
European Central Bank Oversight Division and Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City report notes, the prevalence of nonbank payment processors, 
                                                          
 229.  Id. at 23. 
 230.  Id. at 25.  
 231.  FIRST DATA CORP., UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 
10-K, at 5 (2014), http://investor.firstdata.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=111215&p=irol-reportsannual. 
 232.  TSYS, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, at iii (2014), http://tsys.com/annual-report.html. 
 233.  Id. at 16. 
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involves a . . . complex mechanism with a multiplicity of contact 
points and the dissemination of sensitive data at various points 
along the processing chain, and the consequent vulnerability to 
risks in terms of data security and data (privacy) protection [at] 
any interaction point can be, in itself, a weak point in the chain 
suitable to being exploited by a criminal to intrude the payment 
network for illicit purposes.234 
This increased level of complexity and risk necessarily leads to increased 
concern about externalities. 
D.  The Role of Commercial Cyber Risk Insurance 
Like Varian, Anderson and Moore note that insurance is likely an 
effective way of identifying and managing software security risk in the face 
of network and other externalities.235  Insurance underwriters would assign 
premiums based on the firm’s overall IT infrastructure and management, 
including security.236  The underwriting process, over the long run, would 
create a pool of data and best practices, which would enable cyber risks to 
be valued and managed more accurately.237  However, when Anderson and 
Moore published their paper in 2006, there was not yet a mature cyber risk 
insurance market.238  One of the reasons the insurance market had not 
matured was the uncertainty of legal standards for liability relating to 
defective, insecure software.239 
Many of these uncertainties remain.  A recent Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) insurance industry roundtable noted three 
impediments to the growth of cyber risk insurance:  
• The lack of a secure method for pooling and sharing 
anonymized cyber incident information that could be made 
accessible to carriers and risk management professionals; 
• The need for more robust cyber incident models and 
simulations that could inform underwriting risk factors for 
particular organizations; and 
                                                          
 234.  Stuart Weiner, et al., Nonbanks and Risk in Retail Payments 22 (Joint ECB-Bank of Eng. 
Conference on Payment Sys. and Fin. Stability, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), 
http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Sullivan.pdf. 
 235.  Anderson & Moore, supra note 166, at 612. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id.; see also Examining the Evolving Cyber Insurance Marketplace: Hearing Before the 
S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, Ins. and Data Sec., 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony 
of Michael Menapace), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/90fa0bc7-8686-
4b90-9a1b-3525cc62d4fe/8A982AD17B40EDD0101AD5974A36AD73.menapace-testimony-for-
senate-hearing-on-cyber-insurance.pdf. 
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• The need for companies of all sizes to adopt enterprise risk 
management programs that incorporate cyber risk.240 
Concerning this final point, the DHS report noted that cybersecurity is often 
not seen as a matter for enterprise risk management because of “a cultural 
divide that exists between CISOs on the one hand and chief financial 
officers, legal counsel, and risk managers on the other.”241  The industry 
participants in the DHS roundtable suggested that, until cyber risks are 
understood to present “potential harm to investment, market cap, and 
reputation, most companies will have difficulty elevating responsibility for 
cyber risk management beyond their IT departments.”242 
One of the classic economic functions of the tort system is to 
encourage risk spreading through insurance.243  If principles such as the 
economic loss doctrine limit an actor’s responsibility for the externalities it 
imposes through lax cybersecurity, this function could be frustrated.  On the 
other hand, if a network already spreads risks through what amount to 
contractual forms of self-insurance, a tort remedy will prove redundant and 
will only increase other social costs.  The next Part examines this question 
in the context of consumer credit card data breaches. 
IV.  APPLYING REGULATORY AND TORT THEORY TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS 
DOCTRINE IN CONSUMER CREDIT DATA BREACH CASES 
The discussion of externalities above raises the question of whether the 
tort system can provide useful tools for mitigating systemic cybersecurity 
risk.  This question lies at the heart of debates over the function of private 
litigation as a regulatory tool.244  Even more broadly, it raises the 
fundamental question of whether a system such as the credit card payment 
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 241.  Id. at 2. 
 242.  Id. at 3. 
 243.  See SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 51–57 (generally explaining the importance of insurance 
in an accident and liability system). 
 244.  Cf., e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 60 (2010) (“These findings link long-run historical patterns of divided 
government and legislative-executive polarization, which increased in frequency and intensity 
starting in the late 1960s, with the coincident growth of the role of litigation and courts in the 
implementation and elaboration of federal statutory policy.”); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies 
as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 619 (2013) (“One of the most controversial 
developments in the American regulatory state in recent decades is a marked shift away from 
administrative regulation and enforcement and toward the use of private lawsuits as a regulatory 
tool.”).  
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network requires external regulation at all in relation to systemic threats.  
After all, the network already contractually requires a presumably state-of-
the-art security standard (PCI DSS), indemnifies innocent consumers who 
are victims of fraud, and spreads risk among the participating banks. 
A.  Investment, Not Regulation? 
Some commentators, including Professor Derek Bambauer, addressing 
the question of “cybersecurity” broadly, suggest that a relatively hands-off 
approach is best.  Bambauer argues that, “[t]he Internet is designed for 
exactly the challenge that cyber-attacks produce: disruption to segments of 
the network that force re-routing of data, with the concomitant risk of lost 
information.”245  Bambauer notes that the robust, redundant, self-healing 
nature of the Internet makes major, persistent service outages from cyber 
attacks unlikely.246  For Bambauer, cybersecurity is an “information” 
problem, and he defines “information” as “something that users seek to 
access or engage with.”247  Cybersecurity is only a problem, Bambauer 
suggests, when users are unable to access “information.”  But cybersecurity 
regulation that decreases user access to “information” is 
counterproductive.248  Bambauer, therefore, suggests a minimal suite of 
cybersecurity rules focused on data redundancy and recovery rather than 
breach prevention.249 
There are both confusing and helpful elements to Bambauer’s 
proposal.  One of the most significantly confusing elements is Bambauer’s 
definition of “information.”  In contrast to much of the literature in the 
philosophy of information, Bambauer focuses not on semantic content to 
define “information,” but on a “user’s” action in seeking to “access” or 
“engage” with something.  There are plenty of elements of a 
communications system that a user may wish to “access” or “engage with,” 
however, that should not be considered “information.”  Most significantly, 
this would include the physical “tubes” that Bamabauer previously defined 
                                                          
 245.  Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 613 (2011) (citing Philip 
Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 64). 
 246.  Id. at 617. 
 247.  Id. at 622–25.  Oddly, just before moving into his “information” policy paradigm, 
Bambauer cites Senator Ted Stevens’ definition of “the Internet” as “a series of tubes.”  Id. at 621.  
In fact, it is best to think of the Internet as a multi-layered communications network, incorporating 
physical (tubes), communication, and code layers.  See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, 
Deconstructing Jefferson’s Candle: Towards a Critical Realist Approach to Cultural 
Environmentalism and Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS 203 (2009); David W. Opderbeck, 
The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J. L. TECH. 167 
(2004) [hereinafter Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome]. 
 248.  See Bambauer, supra note 245, at 635–36. 
 249.  Id. at 636–53. 
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as “the Internet.”  Whenever a user goes online, he or she seeks access to 
routers, cables, switches, and so on.  This “physical layer” of the Internet is 
not itself “information” and may require its own appropriate level of 
“cybersecurity” that might differ from what is applicable to the 
“communications” and “code” layers.250 
This problem is evident if we try to apply Bambauer’s solution to the 
large-scale consumer credit card data breach problem confronted in this 
Article.  A massive consumer data breach neither disrupts the physical layer 
of the network nor the communications layer.  The consumer still retains 
her credit card data and can continue to make purchases.  The code layer 
also remains intact.  The network continues to function.  But that 
functioning now entails significant additional costs because the thief is able 
to use the credit card data to obtain benefits from the network without 
providing corresponding benefits to the network. 
A second confusing element of Bambauer’s proposal is that his 
solutions are focused on maintaining access to “information” when he has 
already defined “information” in terms of “access.”  It seems, then, that 
Bambauer’s proposal is circular, unless he is calling for the production of 
more information.  In fact, the production of more information is indeed 
what Bambauer has in mind, since his proposal revolves around 
redundancy, and he suggests that governments should invest in the 
infrastructure required for large scale redundancy.251  The cybersecurity 
problem, for Bambauer, is not about protecting existing bits and bytes of 
information, but rather about generating more and more copies of existing 
bits and bytes so that those bits and bytes are always available somewhere. 
Again, the confusion is evident when this solution is applied to the 
retail data breach context.  In that context, the problem is that semantic 
content, consumer credit card data, has been learned by a party who is not 
supposed to know that information and who can now use it to extract value 
from the system without providing a corresponding exchange of value.  
Redundancy will not solve this problem—in fact it would exacerbate it.  
Indeed, one of the core principles of PCI DSS is to minimize the attack 
surface by severely limiting the storage of credit card data to the data 
sufficient to communicate the semantic content required to complete a 
transaction.252 
                                                          
 250.  See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 
795, 837–44 (2012); David W. Opderbeck, Does the Communications Act of 1934 Contain a 
Hidden Internet Kill Switch?, 65 FED. COMM. L. J. 1, 44–46 (2013). 
 251.  See Bambauer, supra note 245, at 656–58. 
 252.  See PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA 
SECURITY STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 64 (2015) 
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DSS Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know,” the Council 
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Finally, even if redundancy could help mitigate a particular risk, 
building out redundancy entails significant costs.  Bambauer acknowledges 
that, “the vast majority of network infrastructure in the U.S. is privately 
owned,” and he does not argue that this infrastructure should be forcibly de-
privatized.253  Rather, he advocates a taxpayer-funded government subsidy 
of private backbone providers.254  It is hard to see the economic efficiency 
or fairness in a plan that would spread the network externalities generated 
by private Internet backbone providers among the general tax base.  
Certainly such a plan would not encourage the network providers to 
internalize those externalities by adopting more efficient preventative 
cybersecurity, unless the subsidies also came with regulation that 
effectively transfers control over the networks, and thereby control over the 
Internet, to the U.S. government.  Without a government takeover of the 
network and/or stronger preventative cybersecurity, Bambauer’s plan would 
seem to result in a public subsidy of cyber crime that would scale 
exponentially along with network growth and that would quickly become 
unsustainable for the tax base.255 
In short, without any direct reference to externality theory, Bambauer 
effectively suggests that the externalities of cybersecurity should be borne 
by everyone (at least everyone in the U.S., since his solution is U.S.-centric) 
through taxpayer-funded subsidization of the bandwidth required for data 
redundancy, without regard to whether redundancy will solve a particular 
problem such as consumer data breaches.256  Although there is something 
romantic about the science fictional notion of the Internet as a self-healing 
organism that can be nurtured through public care and feeding without 
much concern about preventative medicine, the realities seem much 
harsher.257 
                                                          
states that, “The more people who have access to cardholder data, the more risk there is that a 
user’s account will be used maliciously.  Limiting access to those with a legitimate business 
reason for the access helps an organization prevent mishandling of cardholder data through 
inexperience or malice.”  Id. 
 253.  See Bambauer, supra note 245, at 657–662. 
 254.  Id. at 658–59. 
 255.  Perhaps in some sense this would provide a desirable result.  The network build-out 
required to increase redundancy as cybercrime escalates could have positive spillover benefits 
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equal or exceed the costs of the subsidy.  Moreover, generating positive spillovers from crime 
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 256.  See supra note 245. 
 257.  For an explicit connection between cybersecurity and the science fiction literature on 
cyberspace, see the abstract to Prof. Bambauer’s article Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
1011 (2014).  In that paper, Prof. Bambauer extends his argument that to promote cybersecurity, 
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B.  Public Goods Infrastructure Regulation? 
In his recent work on cybersecurity regulation, Nathan Sales has 
recognized that cybersecurity presents a classic regulatory problem.258  In 
particular, Sales notes that, “cyber-security resembles environmental law in 
that both fields are primarily concerned with negative externalities.”259  
Sales argues that “[j]ust as firms tend to underinvest in pollution controls 
because some costs of their emissions are borne by those who are 
downwind, they also tend to underinvest in cyber-defenses because some 
costs of intrusions are externalized onto others.”260  Sales further analogizes 
cybersecurity to public health regulation.261  Just as infected individuals 
may impose negative externalities on others by spreading disease, 
computers compromised by malware may impose negative externalities on 
others by allowing the malware to spread.262  This may suggest some sort of 
government-sponsored inoculation program.263  Sales also thinks tort law 
can play a role by incentivizing actors in the network to take cyber 
precautions—that is, by forcing actors who create the risk of negative 
externalities to internalize those risks.264 
But Sales recognizes that cybersecurity risk at best can be managed 
and not entirely avoided: “The optimal level of cyber-intrusions is not zero, 
and the optimal level of cyber-security expenditures is not infinity.”265  
Sales presents a rubric for determining the range of possibilities for efficient 
levels of investment in cyber defense based on the “significance” of the 
target and the “sophistication” of the hacker.266  Sales suggests that a 
combination of “significance” and “sophistication” that falls closer to the 
lower left area of his curve—that is, lower “significance” and lower 
“sophistication”—likely represents a level of investment in cybersecurity 
                                                          
also argues there that some key industries in critical sectors should be required to adopt data 
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 263.  Id. at 1440–41.  
 264.  Id. at 1533–39. 
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 266.  Id. at 1516. 
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that is already socially optimal.267  In other words, it is socially optimal for 
relatively insignificant targets that are subject to attacks by relatively 
unsophisticated hackers to invest only modestly in cybersecurity.  A 
combination of “significance” and “sophistication” more towards the upper 
right of Sales’ graph indicates that greater investment in cybersecurity is 
socially optimal.268  In other words, it is socially optimal for relatively 
significant targets that are subject to attacks by relatively sophisticated 
hackers to invest more substantially in cybersecurity.  Sales stops short, 
however, of suggesting that such investment should be required by 
government.269  Instead, Sales argues in favor of private-public partnerships 
and some degree of governmental commitment of financial and other 
resources for higher level security at sensitive facilities, such as power 
plants.270 
In effect, then, Sales conceives of cybersecurity as a public goods and 
externalities problem.  This connection is made explicit by his analogy to 
the classic public goods case, the government’s provision of military 
protection:  “in World War II, factories were not expected to install anti-
aircraft batteries to defend themselves against Luftwaffe bombers.  Nor 
should we expect power plants to defend themselves against foreign 
governments’ cyber-attacks.”271  The connection to public goods theory is 
made explicit in Sales’ graph, in which the protection curve is labeled 
“Public Good.”272 
And yet, Sales also suggests that, “[p]rivate investment in cyber-
security also resembles a tort problem—more precisely, a products liability 
problem.”273  He suggests that products liability law, if applied to items 
such as malware-prone software, could provide incentives to make the 
product more secure.274  But Sales notes that “a venerable chestnut of tort 
law known as the economic loss doctrine,” together with the licensing 
model of most software products, limits the possibility of tort liability for 
cybersecurity lapses.275  Sales thinks this result is incorrect, although it is 
unclear when Sales might apply a negligence rule.276 
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C.  A Role for Negligence Law 
As Sales suggests, the economic loss doctrine should not bar tort 
claims in data breach cases involving the consumer credit card system.  
Because the system is a highly distributed “weakest link” network, there are 
large numbers of failure points that could entail enormous negative 
externalities resulting from any one node’s failure.  Although the parties’ 
relationships are governed by contracts, there is little opportunity for 
important players such as credit unions to negotiate different privacy, 
security, and indemnity terms because the major card brands possess market 
power.  Moreover, the prevalence of third-party payment processors 
significantly skews the discipline that might be imposed through contract 
and might even explode the system. 
Consider again the BJ’s litigation.  That court’s stringent application 
of the economic loss doctrine might suggest that the court thought there 
were adequate remedies sounding in contract.  This is partially correct.  The 
court found there was enough evidence to survive summary judgment 
concerning the plaintiffs’ claims that they were intended beneficiaries of the 
contractual relationship between Fifth Third and BJ’s.277  This was based on 
some documents suggesting that the security requirements in the Visa 
agreements between the acquirer bank and the merchant were designed to 
protect all the stakeholders in the Visa system, including card members and 
issuer banks.278 
Third-party beneficiary theory, however, is a slender reed on which to 
rest the adjustment of risk in a massive consumer credit card breach case.  
The web of contractual relationships instantiated by a consumer credit card 
network such as the Visa network certainly is not intended to transform the 
acquirer banks, or the merchants, into the insurers of the issuer banks 
against their contractual duties to reimburse card holders in the event of 
fraud.  There is a wide range of credit card fraud—not only arising from 
data breaches—that merchants and acquirer banks routinely take some 
measures to mitigate.  But neither merchants nor acquirer banks can prevent 
all fraud. 
The problem seems ripe for the application of classic cost-benefit 
negligence liability principles: there is always a rough calculation between 
the probability of some loss and the burden of measures required to prevent 
the loss.279  If the economic loss doctrine prohibits the use of a cost-benefit 
                                                          
 277.  Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 168–173, 179 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 278.  See id. at 169–71. 
 279.  See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting 
forth the “Hand balancing test”); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); SHAVELL, supra note 7; Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An 
 2016] CYBERSECURITY AND THE PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY  981 
negligence formula in these circumstances, it must also prohibit the use of 
third party beneficiary theory as a proxy for a negligence claim.  Either the 
credit card network agreements expressly provide for indemnification 
between the merchants, acquirer banks, and issuer banks, or they do not; 
and if the issuer banks desire such indemnification in light of data breach 
risks, they can bargain for it, or they can mitigate their risk through 
insurance.  That, at least, is what a rigorous application of the economic 
loss doctrine in a consumer credit card data breach case should suggest.  
The fact that the court in BJ’s allowed third-party beneficiary contract 
claims to proceed might imply that the court knew something was wrong 
with this result. 
The industry security standard referenced in the credit card network 
standards, PCI DSS, may reflect a reasonable standard of care in some 
circumstances but not in others, a factual question that can and should be 
subject to the rigors and discipline of the judicial process.  Indeed, some 
commentators note that the PCI DSS standard has proven inadequate and 
that the industry must move towards a higher level of protection.280  Much 
of the economic literature suggests that the persistent incidence of large 
scale data breaches demonstrates that network externalities or other market 
failures have led to an underinvestment in security.281 
In fact, the persistence of PCI-DSS as the default standard despite its 
apparent shortcomings indicates that an effort to negotiate a different 
standard would entail prohibitively high transaction costs.  Where 
transaction costs are high, including in cyberspace, a negligence/liability 
rule usually is the best way to control externalities.282  This could suggest a 
strict liability rule relating to cybersecurity, but the economic benefits of 
information infrastructure networks such as the global consumer credit card 
system are often also enormous.  As Keith Hylton has suggested, in the 
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presence of high transaction costs, where the economic benefits of an 
activity outweigh the economic costs, the best way to control externalities is 
through a negligence liability rule.283 
For Hylton, this would include certain kinds of negligence-based 
claims for cybersecurity vulnerabilities.284  Hylton notes that: 
Cases of information theft would appear to be ideal for class actions.  
They involve small losses spread across large numbers of victims. . . .  
Where the information holder has been negligent, the penalty 
generated by class action litigants should be large enough to deter 
future negligence.  Moreover, this is theoretically superior on 
deterrence grounds to a scheme involving statutory penalties, because 
the damage judgments awarded in class actions will have a closer fit to 
the actual harm suffered by victims than would statutorily set 
penalties.285 
Similarly, Professor Vincent Johnson has argued that in circumstances 
where there is a business relationship between a database possessor and 
data subject, imposing a duty of care “will force the database possessor, 
who benefits from the use of computerized information, to internalize losses 
relating to improperly accessed data as a cost of doing business.”286 
The suggestion that data breach tort claims should not be barred by the 
economic loss doctrine does not affect the issue of the need to prove 
ascertainable losses in order to have Article III standing.  This means that 
courts could continue to summarily dispose of speculative claims, such as 
consumer claims for future credit monitoring.  Even as to these claims, 
some plaintiffs may be able to prove ascertainable losses relating to credit 
monitoring and other expenses, or the claims may be cognizable in state 
court.287  Such claims should not founder on the economic loss doctrine.288 
Allowing negligence claims for data breaches, where a business or 
individual has suffered an ascertainable pecuniary loss, would open the 
possibility of many kinds of claims that are not currently optimally socially 
adjusted for by contract, including claims involving third-party payment 
processors.  In the process, it would facilitate more open and public scrutiny 
of industry security practices and would provide the impetus for more 
robust and predictable cyber insurance underwriting standards. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Data breaches are pervasive and costly.  Recent civil data breach cases 
have centered on the consumer credit card payment chain in the retail 
industry.  An important issue in such cases is whether the economic loss 
doctrine should bar negligence claims for purely pecuniary losses suffered 
by a non-negligent party, such as an issuing bank or a federal credit union 
that must incur costs to reimburse cardholders for the fraudulent use of 
stolen card numbers.   
The economic loss doctrine should not bar these claims.  Large scale 
data networks, such as the consumer credit card networks, often entail 
significant network externalities.  These include externalities relating to 
market concentration as well as to the “weakest link” nature of security in 
these networks.  Although the primary players in these networks are tied 
together in a complex web of contractual relationships, there are significant 
transaction costs involved with any effort to change or monitor another 
party’s security measures.  Moreover, “outside” entities such as third-party 
payment processors, which are not in contractual privity with all other 
parties in the network, have become ubiquitous.  Under these 
circumstances, a negligence rule should help improve cybersecurity hygiene 
and promote a more robust cyber risk insurance market. 
